SUSE Linux Advisory: rsync Aug 17, 2004, 15 :14 UTC (0 Talkback[s]) (2577 reads)
SUSE Security Announcement
Package: rsync
Announcement-ID: SUSE-SA:2004:026
Date: Monday, Aug 16th 2004 16:00 MEST
Affected products: 8.1, 8.2, 9.0, 9.1
SUSE Linux Database Server,
SUSE eMail Server III, 3.1
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 8, 9
SUSE Linux Firewall on CD/Admin host
SUSE Linux Connectivity Server
SUSE Linux Office Server
Vulnerability Type: remote system compromise
Severity (1-10): 2
SUSE default package: no
Cross References: http://samba.org/rsync/#security_aug04
Content of this advisory:
security vulnerability resolved:
insufficient pathname sanitizing
problem description
solution/workaround
special instructions and notes
package location and checksums
pending vulnerabilities, solutions, workarounds:
KDE
mozilla/firefox
xine-lib
opera
acroread
standard appendix (further information)
1) problem description, brief discussion
The rsync-team released an advisory about a security problem in rsync.
If rsync is running in daemon-mode and without a chroot environment it
is possible for a remote attacker to trick rsyncd into creating an
absolute pathname while sanitizing it.
As a result it is possible to read/write from/to files outside the
rsync directory.
SUSE LINUX ships the rsync daemon with a chroot environment enabled
by default, therefore the default setup is not vulnerable.
2) solution/workaround
As a temporary workaround we suggest to keep the chroot-option of
rsyncd enabled or to avoid the daemon-mode and use SSH as transport
channel if possible.
3) special instructions and notes
After applying the update, all instances of the rsyncd should be
closed and the rsync daemon should be restarted.
Please execute the following command as root: 'rcrsyncd restart'
4) package location and checksums
Please download the update package for your distribution and verify its
integrity by the methods listed in section 3) of this announcement.
Then, install the package using the command "rpm -Fhv file.rpm" to apply
the update.
Our maintenance customers are being notified individually. The packages
are being offered to install from the maintenance web.
5) Pending vulnerabilities in SUSE Distributions and Workarounds:
KDE
The KDE libs package contained two occurrences of insecure handling
of temporary files in the mcoputils code (Thanks to Andrew Tuitt for
reporting this to us) and in the dcopserver code.
These two bugs can be exploited locally to remove and/or overwrite files
with the privileges of the user running a vulnerable KDE application.
A bug in the kdebase3 package allows the content of unrelated browser
windows to be modified.
This issue may be used to trick users into entering sensitive
informations on a malicious web-site.
New packages are available on our FTP servers.
mozilla/firefox
We are currently testing new mozilla/firefox packages that include
several fixes for security-related bugs.
New packages are available on our FTP servers (for some products
we have to delay the delivery of the update package).
xine-lib
This update of xine fix' a buffer overflow in the vcd input source
identifier. This buffer overflow is independent of the media format.
The bug can be used to execute arbitrary commands.
New packages are available on our FTP servers.
opera
The web-browser opera is affected by several security bugs. Due to
the nature of this package we are not able to provide security updates
in a timely manner and have to wait for binary packages to be published
by "Opera Software".
acroread
iDEFENSE reported a buffer overflow and insecure handling of shell
meta-chars in acroread code.
We depend on the release of a new binary package by Adobe.
An update will be available as soon as possible.
6) standard appendix: authenticity verification, additional information
Package authenticity verification:
SUSE update packages are available on many mirror ftp servers all over
the world. While this service is being considered valuable and important
to the free and open source software community, many users wish to be
sure about the origin of the package and its content before installing
the package. There are two verification methods that can be used
independently from each other to prove the authenticity of a downloaded
file or rpm package:
md5sums as provided in the (cryptographically signed) announcement.
using the internal gpg signatures of the rpm package.
execute the command
md5sum <name-of-the-file.rpm>
after you downloaded the file from a SUSE ftp server or its mirrors.
Then, compare the resulting md5sum with the one that is listed in the
announcement. Since the announcement containing the checksums is
cryptographically signed (usually using the key security@suse.de),
the checksums show proof of the authenticity of the package.
We disrecommend to subscribe to security lists which cause the
email message containing the announcement to be modified so that
the signature does not match after transport through the mailing
list software.
Downsides: You must be able to verify the authenticity of the
announcement in the first place. If RPM packages are being rebuilt
and a new version of a package is published on the ftp server, all
md5 sums for the files are useless.
rpm package signatures provide an easy way to verify the authenticity
of an rpm package. Use the command
rpm -v --checksig <file.rpm>
to verify the signature of the package, where <file.rpm> is the
filename of the rpm package that you have downloaded. Of course,
package authenticity verification can only target an un-installed rpm
package file.
Prerequisites:
gpg is installed
The package is signed using a certain key. The public part of this
key must be installed by the gpg program in the directory
~/.gnupg/ under the user's home directory who performs the
signature verification (usually root). You can import the key
that is used by SUSE in rpm packages for SUSE Linux by saving
this announcement to a file ("announcement.txt") and
running the command (do "su -" to be root):
gpg --batch; gpg < announcement.txt | gpg --import
SUSE Linux distributions version 7.1 and thereafter install the
key "build@suse.de" upon installation or upgrade, provided that
the package gpg is installed. The file containing the public key
is placed at the top-level directory of the first CD (pubring.gpg)
and at ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/pubring.gpg-build.suse.de .
SUSE runs two security mailing lists to which any interested party may
subscribe:
The information in this advisory may be distributed or reproduced,
provided that the advisory is not modified in any way. In particular,
it is desired that the clear-text signature shows proof of the
authenticity of the text.
SUSE Linux AG makes no warranties of any kind whatsoever with respect
to the information contained in this security advisory.
Type Bits/KeyID Date User ID
pub 2048R/3D25D3D9 1999-03-06 SuSE Security Team <security@suse.de>
pub 1024D/9C800ACA 2000-10-19 SuSE Package Signing Key <build@suse.de>
